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I. ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. This Court has recognized a narrow exception to the 
requirement that a non-party to litigation receive notice and an opportunity 
to be heard before an order is entered that may be applied to that non-party, 
limiting that exception to cases where the non-party is acting in concert 
with a party, or the party can only act through others (such as a union that 
can only act through its members).   
Can that narrow exception be extended to a non-party without any 
factual findings to support that extension, thus allowing courts to deprive 
online publishers of notice and the right to be heard before infringing their 
First Amendment rights by ordering them to remove online content? 
2. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) and (e)(3) prohibit courts from treating 
any “provider … of an interactive computer service … as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another content provider,” and, 
separately, from permitting a “cause of action [to] be brought” or “liability 
[to] be imposed” if it is “inconsistent with this section.”   
Despite Section 230’s statutory immunity, may a court enjoin a 
website publisher and require it to remove third-party-created content from 
its website—and impose contempt citations and related liabilities that might 
flow from a failure to abide by such an injunction—merely because the 
plaintiff chose not to name the website publisher as a party in the litigation? 
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II. REASON REVIEW SHOULD BE GRANTED 
Occasionally a legal principle adopted to prevent abuse gets 
transformed through misinterpretation into a weapon for abuse.  When that 
happens in California, it falls to this Court to step in and correct such 
misuse.  This is such a time. 
In a published decision, the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate 
District, Division Four, affirmed an injunction, entered without notice or an 
opportunity to be heard, against Yelp.  The injunction required Yelp—a 
non-party in the litigation—to remove reviews from its website Yelp.com 
(along with Yelp’s related websites and mobile applications, referred to 
simply as “Yelp”).  Without meaningful analysis, and dismissing Yelp’s 
First Amendment right to control its website, the appellate court invoked a 
common law principle created to prevent parties from evading an injunction 
through gamesmanship (i.e., by acting in collusion with non-parties).  The 
court did not find, or even consider whether, Yelp had engaged in such 
conduct.  The appellate Opinion contemplates contempt and sanctions 
proceedings against Yelp if it refuses to comply, although Yelp has no 
material connection to the enjoined party and engaged in no wrongful 
conduct. 
This Court’s review of the court of appeal’s due process analysis is 
“necessary to secure uniformity of decision [and] to settle an important 
question of law”—whether non-parties are entitled to notice before being 
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subject to an injunction that infringes their rights, including, as here, 
fundamental First Amendment rights.  Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(b)(1).  The 
appellate Opinion drastically expands the narrow exception to due process 
invoked by the court, applying it to a novel factual scenario without any 
evidence that the exception should apply—and, indeed, expressly 
disclaiming the need for any evidence.  Op. 21.     
In effect—and without analyzing whether these cases should be 
extended to this very different factual scenario—the court turned a narrow 
exception into a general rule, which now allows courts across California to 
expressly name non-parties in injunctions without any factual findings of 
misconduct.  Cf. Eric Goldman, Yelp Forced to Remove Defamatory 
Reviews—Hassell v. Bird, Tech. & Mark. Law Blog, June 8, 2016, 
available at http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2016/06/yelp-forced-to-
remove-defamatory-reviews-hassell-v-bird.htm (“Goldman II”) (“I guess 
California courts have virtually unlimited discretion to apply injunctions to 
non-parties as they see fit?”).  In doing so, the court rendered meaningless 
the careful guidelines California courts have adopted to limit the scope of 
this narrow exception, giving litigants nationwide an incentive to forum 
shop in California and a roadmap to circumvent due process rights here. 
The court of appeal combined its unwarranted expansion of this 
limited common law principle, with an unprecedented narrowing of the 
protection provided by the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 
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(“Section 230”), to deny Yelp the federal immunity it would have received 
if Hassell had sued it.  Addressing this issue for the first time in California, 
the court exalted the form of the action—namely, the fact that Yelp was 
tactically not named as a party—over the substance of Section 230 and 
Congress’ clear intent in enacting it to protect websites from actions that 
treat them as publishers or distributors of third-party content. 
Section 230 immunity plays a vital role in the legal landscape that 
has allowed the Internet to flourish.  As this Court noted a decade ago in its 
sole decision evaluating Section 230, “[t]he provisions of section 230(c)(1), 
conferring broad immunity on Internet intermediaries, are [] a strong 
demonstration of legislative commitment to the value of maintaining a free 
market for online expression.”  Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 
56 (“Barrett”).  In Barrett, this Court made clear that Section 230 
immunizes website operators from actions by disgruntled businesses hoping 
to punish them for allowing third-party content—even defamatory 
content—to remain on their websites.  Id. at 39-40.  The court of appeal 
followed Barrett in name alone.  Op. at 27.  It narrowly interpreted Section 
230 to give plaintiffs a means of directly punishing website publishers for 
displaying third party content.  In doing so, it created a clear conflict 
between its holding and the broad interpretation of Section 230 that this 
Court recognized in Barrett. 
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The Section 230 ruling is particularly problematic because it is 
utterly inconsistent with the court’s due process ruling.  Section 230(c)(1) 
broadly mandates that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”  Yet here, the court 
affirmed an injunction imposed on Yelp by stretching due process law to 
conclude that Yelp was acting “with or for” Bird (Op. 30-31)—treating 
Yelp as standing in Bird’s shoes solely based on Yelp’s role as an online 
publisher of her alleged content.  This contradiction injects confusion into 
each of these legal principles. 
This Court’s review in this matter is “necessary to secure uniformity 
of decision [and] to settle an important question of law”—should California 
courts continue to adhere to the broad interpretation of Section 230 that this 
Court approved in Barrett?  Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(b)(1).  
The impact of the court of appeal’s due process and Section 230 
decisions for the vitality of online speech is immense.  Viewed only 
through the prism of review websites such as Yelp, this is a tremendously 
important issue because of the high value that easy access to consumer 
reviews offers to the general public.  E.g., Edwards v. District of Columbia, 
755 F.3d 996, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[f]urther incentivizing a quality 
consumer experience are the numerous consumer review websites, like 
Yelp ..., which provide consumers a forum to rate the quality of their 
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experiences”).  If Yelp and entities like it are denied their right to exercise 
editorial control in publishing consumer reviews—providing businesses an 
effective tool to remove critical commentary—consumers will suffer. 
But the appellate decision reaches far beyond this single area, vast 
though it may be.  A wide array of website publishers display third-party 
content, including political organizations, media entities, and repositories of 
creative content such as YouTube, to name only a few.  Some of this 
content entertains or educates, while some simultaneously offends, and 
much of it walks a line between protected and unprotected speech.  The 
value of such content lies in diversity, and websites benefit from offering 
these disparate views and opinions to their users.   
This does not leave plaintiffs like Hassell without a remedy—
although if it did it would not matter because Congress’ intent controls.  For 
twenty years, Congress has insisted that plaintiffs look to the content 
creator alone for a remedy, through tools such as judgment liens and 
contempt proceedings—post-judgment options that Hassell never pursued 
here.  During those twenty years, no court has approved Hassell’s stratagem 
of denying a website publisher its due process rights in order to tactically 
avoid the immunity Congress established through Section 230.  The 
appellate court’s blessing of the injunction entered against Yelp, following 
an uncontested hearing to prove up the default judgment against Bird 
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(A00213), is a loophole that future plaintiffs will exploit to escape Section 
230’s broad immunity. 
Yelp and other websites will suffer as a result of this Opinion.  But 
more importantly, members of the public that rely on the wealth of online 
third-party commentary—to aid decision-making on myriad issues like 
consumer purchases, politics, and employment— will be harmed as 
subjects of criticism follow Hassell’s example:  intentionally sue the 
commenter alone, perhaps in a manner that maximizes the chance that he or 
she will be unable or unwilling to defend the lawsuit regardless of its 
underlying merit, and then after a default judgment present the injunction to 
the website publisher as an unassailable fait accompli.   
The issues presented in this case are unresolved in California.  
Together, the court of appeal’s holdings threaten to undermine the validity 
and efficacy of the information available to consumers, and online speech 
generally.  On each of these questions of first impression in California, the 
court of appeal reached the wrong result.  Yelp requests, therefore, that this 
Court accept review and resolve the important issues presented. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
A. Yelp’s Website Publishes Tens of Millions Of Third-Party 
Consumer Reviews.  
Yelp allows any member of the public to read and write online 
reviews about local businesses, government services, and other entities.  
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A00240.  Yelp is available to the public at no charge and without any 
registration requirement.  Id.  Those who register by creating an account 
may write reviews about businesses and service providers, and thus 
contribute to a growing body of tens of millions of publicly-available 
consumer reviews.  Id.  Tens of millions of other users read the reviews on 
Yelp when making a wide range of consumer and other decisions.  Id.  The 
businesses listed on Yelp also can create free accounts, which allow them 
to publicly respond to any review, with such a response appearing next to 
the original review.  Id.  Reviewers on Yelp can remove their reviews at 
any time.  A00841.  As Yelp’s website explains, it applies automated 
software to all reviews posted in an attempt to provide the most helpful 
reviews to consumers.  A00519. 
B. Hassell Obtains An Injunction Against Yelp Without 
Giving It Any Notice. 
1. Third-Party Users Write Critical Reviews About 
Hassell Law Group On Yelp. 
Hassell, a San Francisco attorney, owns The Hassell Law Group, 
P.C.  A00006.  According to Hassell’s Complaint, Bird suffered a personal 
injury on June 16, 2012, and retained The Hassell Law Group.  A00002-3.  
After a few months, Hassell ended the attorney-client relationship.  Id.  On 
January 28, 2013 a user with the screen name “Birdzeye B.” posted a one-
star review of The Hassell Law Group on Yelp, complaining about 
Hassell’s legal services.  A00018.  Believing that “Birdzeye B.” was Bird, 
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Hassell sent Bird an email that day, requesting she remove the “factual 
inaccuracies and defamatory remarks” from Yelp.  A00005.  Bird replied 
the next day, complaining about Hassell’s representation.  A00348.   
2. Hassell Sues Bird And Obtains A Default 
Judgment, Which Includes An Injunction Against 
Yelp. 
On April 10, 2013, Dawn Hassell individually, and the Hassell Law 
Group P.C., filed a complaint against Bird, but not Yelp, in San Francisco 
Superior Court.  A00002.  The suit asserted claims based on two allegedly 
defamatory reviews—one by Birdzeye B. and another by a reviewer 
identified as J.D. (A00004-5)1—and sought compensatory and punitive 
damages.  It also sought injunctive relief against Bird only.  A00013.  
Although the Birdzeye B. public account profile stated that its creator lived 
in Los Angeles (A00091), Bird was served through substitute service on the 
owner of the Oakland home in which Bird was injured, who told the 
process server that he had not seen Bird in months.  A00026.  On July 11, 
2013, the court entered a default against Bird.  A00023. 
On November 1, 2013, Hassell filed a Summary of the Case in 
Support of Default Judgment and Request for Injunctive Relief.  A00033-
36.  Hassell significantly expanded the relief being sought as described in 
the Complaint, adding another allegedly defamatory statement to her claim 
                                                 
1 Hassell claimed that “J.D.” was Bird based on the review’s use of 
capitalization, despite the content being at odds with the original challenged 
statement.  A00034, A00099.   
 10 
 
(A00036, A00102)2 and demanding for the first time that the court “make 
an order compelling Defendant and Yelp to remove the defamatory 
statements, including all entire posts, immediately.  If for any reason 
Defendant does not remove them all by the Court-ordered deadline (which 
is likely given Defendant’s refusal to answer the complaint), the Court 
should order Yelp.com to remove all 3 of them.”  A00051 (emphasis in 
original). 
Plaintiffs’ Request for Judgment went even further, seeking “an 
Order ordering Yelp.com to remove the reviews and subsequent comments 
of the reviewer within 7 business days of the date of the court’s Order.”  
A00051.  Hassell intentionally did not serve her application for default 
judgment on Yelp or otherwise notify Yelp about it.  A00243; see also 
A00837.  The court granted the requested injunction, including the part 
directed to non-party Yelp.  A00213.  The court made no factual findings as 
to Yelp.  Id. 
C. The Trial Court Denies Yelp’s Motion To Vacate The 
Injunction. 
On January 28, 2014, Yelp’s registered agent for service of process 
received by mail a letter enclosing a notice of entry of judgment or order 
and threatening Yelp with contempt proceedings if it did not comply with 
the order.  A00537-547.  On February 3, 2014, Yelp responded to Hassell 
                                                 
2 She added another post from Birdzeye B. that primarily criticized 
the litigation.  A00036, A00102. 
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by letter, stating that as a non-party which did not receive notice or an 
opportunity to be heard, Yelp was not bound by the terms of the Judgment.  
A00548-550.  Yelp further explained that Section 230 precludes 
enforcement of the injunction, or liability as to Yelp.  A00549.  Hassell did 
not respond until April 30, 2014.  She claimed that her office was 
“currently setting a motion to enforce the court’s order against Yelp,” but 
did not respond substantively to Yelp’s position.  A00551.     
On May 23, 2014, Yelp moved to vacate the Judgment.  A00225-
470.  Hassell opposed Yelp’s Motion to Vacate.  A00471-572.  On 
September 29, 2014, the trial court denied Yelp’s Motion.  A00808.  It 
quoted from Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 906 (“Ross”), 
and Berger v. Superior Court (1917) 175 Cal. 719, 721 (“Berger”), to hold 
that injunctions may run to non-parties who are aiding and abetting an 
enjoined person to violate an injunction, and concluded that Yelp fit within 
this exception to general due process requirements.  A00808-809.  It did not 
address Yelp’s claim to immunity under Section 230. 
D. The Court Of Appeal Affirms The Trial Court’s Decision. 
In a published decision, the court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s 
conclusion that Yelp was bound by the injunction.  Op. 1-2.  As relevant 
here, the court characterized the order requiring Yelp to remove content 
from its website as a “removal order”—not an injunction (Op. 1)—and 
treated the “removal order” as if it were separate from the Judgment (e.g., 
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Op. 10-11 (concluding that Yelp was not aggrieved by the default 
judgment, but was aggrieved by the removal order)).3 
After evaluating Yelp’s standing to appeal (issues not raised here), 
the appellate court rejected Yelp’s argument that due process barred 
enforcement of the injunction against it.  Op. 18-23.  The court noted, first, 
that “An Injunction Can Run Against a Nonparty.”  Op. 18.  Citing a 
handful of cases, the court concluded that “settled principles undermine 
Yelp’s theory that the trial court was without any authority to include a 
provision in the Bird judgment which ordered Yelp to effectuate the 
injunction against Bird by deleting her defamatory reviews.”  Op. 19. 
The appellate court did not discuss or apply any of the requirements 
that California courts have enunciated to justify extending an injunction to 
a non-party.  Op. 19-21.  Instead, it simply distinguished the cases Yelp 
cited, concluding that none presented facts similar to those presented here.  
Id.  The court made clear that its decision did not turn on the facts of the 
case, and that the question of whether Yelp was “aiding and abetting” 
Bird’s violation of the injunction “has no bearing on the question whether 
                                                 
3 Some of the court’s holdings seemed to grow out of this novel 
characterization of the injunction against Yelp, and its Opinion ultimately 
turned on its conclusion that Yelp was not subject to an injunction at all.  
E.g., Op. 29 (“[a]gain though, the party that was enjoined from publishing 
content in this case was Bird, ….”).  But the “removal order” is a classic 
injunction and the court of appeal created uncertainty in the law by treating 
it as anything else.  E.g., PV Little Italy, LLC v. MetroWork Condominium 
Ass’n (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 132, 143 n.5.  
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the trial court was without power to issue the removal order in the first 
instance.”  Op. 21. 
The court next rejected Yelp’s argument that the First Amendment 
protects its right to distribute Bird’s speech.  Op. 21-23.  The court 
distinguished a U.S. Supreme Court case holding that book and magazine 
distributors are entitled to due process in connection with a seizure order.  
Op. 21-22, citing Marcus v. Search Warrants (1961) 367 U.S. 717 
(“Marcus”).  The court explained that “in this context, it appears to us that 
the removal order does not treat Yelp as a publisher of Bird’s speech, but 
rather as the administrator of the forum that Bird utilized to publish her 
defamatory reviews.”  Id.  The court also suggested that the issue was 
whether a prior hearing was required, and that this case differs from 
Marcus because here “specific speech has already been found to be 
defamatory in a judicial proceeding.”  Op. 23. 
The court also rejected Yelp’s argument that the injunction is an 
unconstitutional prior restraint.  Op. 23-26.  Expanding this Court’s 
decision in Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141 
(“Balboa Island”), the court held that “the trial court had the power to make 
the part of this order requiring Yelp to remove the [statements at issue] 
because the injunction prohibiting Bird from repeating those statements 
was issued following a determination at trial that those statements are 
defamatory.”  Op. 25.   
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Finally, the court held that Section 230 did not protect Yelp from 
Hassell’s injunction.  Op. 26-31.  Its decision turned largely on the fact that 
Hassell intentionally chose not to sue Yelp, or even give it advance notice 
of her claims, which the court found “distinguish[ed] the present case from 
Yelp’s authority, all cases in which causes of action or lawsuits against 
internet service providers were dismissed pursuant to section 230.”  Op. 28 
(citations omitted); see also id. 29-30 (distinguishing cases barring actions 
for injunctive relief because in each the claim was asserted “against an 
Internet service provider defendant in a civil lawsuit”); id. 30-31 (“[i]f an 
injunction is itself a form of liability, that liability was imposed on Bird, not 
Yelp”).  The court rejected each of Yelp’s arguments.  Op. 29-31.   
Yelp did not file a petition for rehearing. 
IV. REVIEW IS NECESSARY TO RESOLVE TWO QUESTIONS 
VITAL TO WEBSITES THAT PUBLISH THIRD-PARTY CONTENT 
A. This Court Should Accept Review To Establish That 
Website Publishers Are Entitled To Notice And An 
Opportunity To Be Heard Before They Are Ordered To 
Remove Content. 
The injunction here names Yelp—although it is not a party to this 
action—and specifically orders Yelp to remove content from its website.  
Invoking what it described as “settled principles” to reject Yelp’s due 
process arguments, the court insisted that a non-party may be subject to an 
injunction if it is “acting in concert with the enjoined party and in support 
of its claims.”  Op. 19 (citations omitted). 
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But none of the cases the court cited touches on the issue presented 
here:  whether a non-party to litigation has a right to challenge an order that 
expressly names it and affects its own rights—here, Yelp’s right to maintain 
critical reviews on its website, often in conflict with the desires of 
businesses that disavow the criticism and aim to remove such commentary 
from public view.4  And none allowed an injunction where the non-party 
has such a remote connection to the party enjoined.  The only connection 
between Yelp and Bird is that Bird, like tens of millions of people, posts 
reviews on Yelp.  The court’s application of an exceedingly narrow 
exception to fundamental due process requirements grossly expanded that 
exception beyond its intent and purpose. 
1. Due Process Requires Notice And An Opportunity 
To Be Heard Before Being Subject To An Order 
Affecting Rights. 
The requirements of notice and hearing are firmly rooted in the 
United States and California Constitutions.  As the court made clear in 
Estate of Buchman (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 546, 559, “[t]he fundamental 
conception of a court of justice is condemnation only after notice and 
hearing.”  Thus, “[t]he power vested in a judge is to hear and determine, not 
                                                 
4 If Yelp immediately removed every review a business owner 
claimed was false or even defamatory, it soon would have no critical 
reviews on its website.  To maintain the integrity of its website—for the 




to determine without hearing,” and the Constitution requires a fair hearing.  
Id. at 560; see also People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 263-64. 
This Court long ago reaffirmed as a “seemingly self-evident 
proposition that a judgment in personam may not be entered against one not 
a party to the action.”  Fazzi v. Peters (1968) 68 Cal.2d 590, 591 (“Fazzi”).  
As the U.S. Supreme Court has held, courts “may not grant an enforcement 
order or injunction so broad as to make punishable the conduct of persons 
who act independently and whose rights have not been adjudged according 
to law.”  Regal Knitwear Co. v. N.L.R.B. (1945) 324 U.S. 9, 13 (“Regal 
Knitwear”). 
Despite this settled constitutional principle, and without giving Yelp 
any notice, the trial court enjoined speech that Yelp displays and uses to 
provide an aggregate rating of the Hassell Law Group to consumers looking 
to hire lawyers.  The court of appeal affirmed, declaring without analysis or 
supporting legal authority that the injunction “does not treat Yelp as a 
publisher of Bird’s speech, but rather as the administrator of the forum that 
Bird utilized to publish her defamatory reviews.”  Op. 22.  This faulty 
reasoning ignores Yelp’s important role as an online publisher and its 
strong interest in developing and maintaining a trusted resource that 
provides helpful consumer reviews to the public, including critical reviews 
that dissatisfied clients post.  Yelp and other online forums like it are not 
merely the “administrators” of their websites—they are publishers and 
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editors whose actions to disseminate speech are fully protected by the First 
Amendment and due process rights.  Yelp, for example, has developed 
automated software designed to enhance users’ experiences by showcasing 
more helpful content over potentially less helpful content (like fake or paid-
for reviews).  E.g., A00519.  And Yelp maintains terms of service and 
content guidelines that, when violated, lead to the removal of offending 
content.  A00561. 
To support its overreach, the court purported to distinguish Marcus, 
367 U.S. 717, but it overlooked the fundamental point of Marcus and the 
many other cases that protect the right to distribute speech.  Op. 22-23, 
citing Marcus; Heller v. New York (1973) 413 U.S. 483, 488.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court recognized a First Amendment right to distribute speech, 
separate from the right to make the speech in the first instance, which 
cannot be infringed without notice and an opportunity to be heard.  See 
Marcus, 367 U.S. at 731-732 (wholesale distributor of books and 
magazines had right to prompt hearing in connection with seized materials); 
Heller, 413 U.S. at 489-490 (seizure without a prior hearing is permissible 
only if adequate procedural safeguards are followed).   
The court of appeal’s invocation of Heller—which decided whether 
a party is entitled to an adversarial hearing before speech is seized—missed 
the point.  Op. 23.  Yelp did not receive any hearing; it had no opportunity 
to challenge the trial court’s conclusion—reached in an uncontested 
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hearing following a default judgment—that the speech at issue was 
defamatory.  Because Yelp has a separate First Amendment right to 
distribute speech, it was entitled to a hearing to oppose entry of the 
overbroad injunction that restrained speech on its website.  See Heller, 413 
U.S. at 489 (“because only a judicial determination in an adversary 
proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only 
a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid 
final restraint” (citations, internal quotes omitted; emphasis in original)).  
The fiction adopted by the court of appeal—inventing a role it coined 
“administrator of the forum,” which apparently has none of the 
constitutional protections granted to publishers—to brush aside Yelp’s clear 
interest in the integrity of its website led to an unprecedented travesty of 
justice here.  With the court’s approval this shocking new framework to 
deprive online publishers of due process and First Amendment rights can 
be repeatedly applied throughout California. 
Hassell intentionally sought to abrogate Yelp’s due process rights 
when she moved for a default judgment; as she put it she “anticipated that 
Defendant Bird would refuse to remove the Yelp review.”  A00482.5  The 
court of appeal approved this gambit, holding that Yelp was not entitled to 
notice.  As shown below, however, the line of cases it invoked does not 
                                                 
5 Indeed, at the hearing on the motion to vacate, Hassell admitted 
that she did not name Yelp in her Complaint because Yelp is immune from 
suit under Section 230.  A00837; see Section IV.B.1, infra.   
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support the broad abandonment of due process that occurred here.  This 
Court should accept review to correct this incredible overreach, and ensure 
that the narrow exception to black letter due process requirements is 
appropriately limited. 
2. The Court Of Appeal Grossly Diminished 
Fundamental Due Process Protections By 
Expanding A Narrow Rule Allowing Courts To 
Enjoin Aiders, Abettors, And Agents Of Parties. 
The court of appeal rejected Yelp’s due process argument, invoking 
what it characterized as “settled principles” of law that in limited 
circumstances allow an injunction to “run to classes of persons with or 
through whom the enjoined party may act.”  Op. 19.  In doing so, the court 
invoked a narrow exception to the general due process requirement of 
notice and an opportunity to be heard, which allows an injunction to be 
enforced against a non-party who is not named in the injunction based on 
evidence showing that the enjoined party and the non-party acted together 
to evade the injunction, or the enjoined party and non-party have a close 
relationship such as union and member.  Op. 19-21.   
The appellate court distinguished Yelp’s cases and held that these 
“settled principles” authorized an injunction that expressly applies to Yelp, 
without any evidence that Yelp engaged in the type of conduct, or had the 
type of relationship with the enjoined party, that California courts 
consistently have required to apply an injunction to a non-party.  Id. 
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In reaching its strained conclusion, the appellate court stretched far 
beyond the original purpose of this common law doctrine.  In Regal 
Knitwear, 324 U.S. at 14, the U.S. Supreme Court explained the very 
narrow purpose of this exception—that successors and assigns may be 
bound by an injunction if they are “instrumentalities through which 
defendant seeks to evade an order or [] come within the description of 
persons in active concert or participation with them in the violation of an 
injunction.”  The Supreme Court did not decide if the non-parties there 
could be held liable for violating the injunction, although it cautioned that it 
“depends on an appraisal of his relations and behavior and not upon mere 
construction of terms of the order.”  Id. at 15; see also In re Lennon (1897) 
166 U.S. 548, 554-555 (injunction against railroad company could be 
enforced against one of its employees).   
As one California court has explained, under the “common practice” 
of “mak[ing] the injunction run also to classes of persons through whom the 
enjoined party may act,” “enjoined parties may not play jurisdictional shell 
games; they may not nullify an injunctive decree by carrying out prohibited 
acts with or through nonparties to the original proceeding.”  People ex rel. 
Gwinn v. Kothari (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 759, 766-767 (reversing 
injunction against property owners that also would bind all future owners of 
the property) (citations omitted; emphasis added).  This rule allows courts 
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to enjoin third parties who are acting at the behest and for the benefit of the 
third party, and not in pursuit of their own rights. 
Yelp is aware of only one case presenting similar facts, and that 
court rejected the argument Hassell makes here.  Blockowicz v. Williams 
(N.D. Ill. 2009) 675 F.Supp.2d 912, aff’d (7th Cir. 2010) 630 F.3d 563.  
There, the court refused to enforce an injunction as to a non-party website 
hosting defamatory content, explaining that the website operator’s “only 
act, entering into a contract with the defendants, occurred long before the 
injunction was issued.  Since the injunction was issued, [the website 
operator] has simply done nothing, and it has certainly not actively assisted 
the defendants in violating the injunction.”  Id. at 916. 
In contrast, none of the cases the court of appeal invoked to support 
its holding enforced an injunction against a non-party on facts like those 
here.  Op. 19.  In most, the court refused to enforce an injunction against a 
non-party, finding that the relationship with the party was not close enough 
to justify the attempt, or remanding for further consideration of the 
evidence against the non-party.  Berger, 175 Cal. at 719-720 (injunction 
against union and members could not be enforced against non-union 
member ); Planned Parenthood Golden Gate v. Garibaldi (2003) 107 
Cal.App.4th 345, 353 (refusing to enforce injunction against abortion 
protestors neither named individually or as class members); People v. 
Conrad (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 896, 903-904 (injunction against anti-
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abortion group could not be applied to separate group); In re Berry (1968) 
68 Cal.2d 137, 155-156 (reversing injunction related to union activity 
because it enjoined persons acting “in concert among themselves”).    
The court of appeal cited only one decision affirming enforcement of 
an injunction against a non-party.  Op. 19, citing Ross, 19 Cal.3d at 905.6  
In Ross, this Court held that an injunction against a state agency could be 
enforced against county agencies that served as agents in administering the 
program at issue.  But that holding turned on the relationship between the 
state and county agencies.  Id. at 907-908.  The Court explained that 
because the state agency “could comply with the provisions of the … order 
… only through the actions of county welfare departments, it is clear that 
such counties could not disobey the order with impunity.”  Id. at 909.  Here, 
in contrast, Bird herself could comply with the injunction at any time by 
removing the review from Yelp; no cooperation by Yelp is required to 
effectuate the injunction against Bird.  A00841.  And needless to say, Yelp 
is not Bird’s agent.  
The court of appeal’s opinion skews this line of cases, drastically 
expanding them beyond their original intent, in three fundamental ways.  
First, in none of the cases cited—and indeed, no case known to Yelp—did 
                                                 
6 In addition, the court separately rejected Yelp’s reliance on People 
ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1125, in which this Court 
affirmed a gang injunction against non-parties because “the gang itself, 
acting through its membership, [] was responsible for creating and 
maintaining the public nuisance” at issue. 
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the court approve an injunction that required a specifically-named non-
party to act, or not act, as ordered.  Each evaluated application of an 
injunction to a non-party not explicitly named.  E.g., In re Berry, 68 Cal.2d 
at 155-156 (strikers, who were not members of enjoined union); Planned 
Parenthood, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 350-351 (abortion protestors).  In 
explicitly directing the injunction to Yelp, the court treated Yelp as if it had 
been present in the case all along with full opportunity to stand up for its 
rights as a publisher, ignoring the reality that Hassell intentionally 
prevented Yelp from learning about the application for the injunction in the 
first place.  The appellate court’s decision does not even mention the fact 
that the court was applying these cases to a completely different set of facts, 
or contemplate the implications of its decision to apply this line of cases to 
the different facts presented here.  Its perfunctory analysis led to the wrong 
result.   
Second, the court made clear that it did not base its decision on any 
conduct by Yelp, explaining that the question of whether Yelp aided and 
abetted Bird’s alleged violation of the injunction was “potentially 
improper” and “has no bearing on the question whether the trial court was 
without power to issue the [injunction] in the first instance.”  Op. 21.  Thus, 
the court affirmed the injunction against Yelp without any evidence that 
Yelp engaged in the type of conduct that courts—including this Court—
consistently require to justify applying an injunction to a non-party 
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allegedly colluding with the enjoined party.  Op. 19; e.g., Regal Knitwear, 
324 U.S. at 16 (a decision to enjoin a specific party as a successor or assign 
would require “a judicial hearing, in which their operation could be 
determined on a concrete set of facts”); see also id. at 15 (“whether a 
nonparty is bound ‘depends on an appraisal of his relations and behavior’”).  
Here, there was no appraisal of Yelp’s behavior or conduct before Yelp was 
explicitly named in the injunction.  A00211.   
No prior case has gone so far.7  Moreover, the court reached its 
decision without any analysis or appreciation of how its unfettered 
expansion of this formerly narrow exception to due process will affect 
websites like Yelp, which publish content authored by tens of millions of 
third parties, but which have no other relationships with those third parties 
that justify being treated as their agents.   
Third, the court ignored Yelp’s real interests in its own website—
permitting California courts to view a non-party’s conduct solely through 
the lens of a plaintiff’s unopposed characterizations of the defendant’s 
alleged conduct, without regard to the separate interests of the non-party 
(here Yelp, a publisher) in the conduct or speech being enjoined.  The court 
rejected the cases Yelp cited solely because they involved money 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., This Would Make Me Yelp!, 111 North Hill Street, A 
Blog of California Civil Procedure, July 10, 2016, available at 
http://caccp.blogspot.com/2016/07/this-would-make-me-yelp.html?m=1 
(“this one really manages to go off the rails”). 
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judgments.  Op. 20-21, citing Fazzi, 68 Cal.2d 590; Tokio Marine & Fire 
Ins. Corp. v. W. Pac. Roofing Corp. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 110.  The 
appellate court did not explain why Yelp should receive less protection 
against a prior restraint—which this Court has described as “one of the 
most extraordinary remedies known to our jurisprudence [which] carr[ies] a 
heavy burden against constitutional validity” (People v. Lucas (2014) 60 
Cal.4th 153, 261, disapproved on other grounds, People v. Romero (2015) 
62 Cal.4th 1; citation omitted)—than it would against a mere money 
judgment. 
The court invoked Balboa Island to support its decision but this too 
was an unwarranted expansion of existing law.  In Balboa Island, this Court 
held that a court may enjoin the repetition of a statement found to be 
defamatory at a contested trial.  40 Cal.4th at 1158.  The court approved the 
injunction in part, although it also found part to be invalid because it 
applied to the defendant and “all other persons in active concert and 
participation with her,” but no evidence in the record supported a finding 
that anyone else made defamatory statements.  Id. at 1160.  Here, unlike in 
Balboa Island, the court approved a prior restraint (i) against a non-party 
that had no notice or opportunity to oppose the injunction (ii) following a 
default judgment, not a contested trial, (iii) based on an Order that did not 
evaluate any of the individual statements to determine if they are false, 
defamatory, and unprivileged.  A00211.  Cf. Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at 57 
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(“[d]efamation law is complex, requiring consideration of multiple 
factors”).  Balboa Island does not support the prior restraint entered against 
Yelp here.  
As discussed below, the court’s refusal to acknowledge Yelp’s 
interests in its own website led to the second issue raised for review—the 
court’s rejection of the statutory immunity that Section 230 guarantees Yelp 
and others that provide forums for third-party content. 
B. This Court Should Accept Review To Make Clear That 
Section 230 Bars Injunctions Against Website Publishers 
Related To Third-Party Content.  
This Court also should review—and reverse—the appellate court’s 
conclusion that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act does not 
apply to an injunction entered against a non-party.  Op. 28.  According to a 
noted commentator, this is the worst recent Section 230 decision, and 
“opens up holes that everyone—users and non-users alike—can abuse.”  
See Goldman II, supra (“I can’t stress enough how terrible this opinion is, 
and how much danger it poses to Section 230.”).8 
                                                 
8 As Prof. Goldman proclaimed the same day the appellate court 
issued its decision, “[i]t’s been a tough year for Section 230.”  Eric 
Goldman, WTF Is Going On With Section 230? – Cross v. Facebook, 
Technology & Marketing Law Blog, June 7, 2016, available at 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2016/06/wtf-is-going-on-with-section-
230-cross-v-facebook.htm.  In response to the decision here, Prof. Goldman 
declared that “[t]oday’s opinion is worse than *all* of the cases I discussed 
yesterday—and you better believe I don’t make that statement lightly!”  
Goldman II, supra; see also California Appellate Court Decision Forces 
Yelp to Remove Defamatory Review, Defamation Removal Law, available 
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California’s courts of appeal have been increasingly inconsistent in 
their application of Section 230.  In the past decade, most courts have 
routinely followed this Court’s mandate in Barrett to broadly construe 
Section 230 immunity.  E.g., Doe II v. MySpace Inc. (2009) 175 
Cal.App.4th 561, 563 (rejecting claims against Internet social networking 
site brought by teenagers who were sexually assaulted by adults they met 
through site).  Recently, though, the First District Court of Appeal has 
narrowly construed the statute to avoid immunity even where the statute 
applies under its plain language.  Hardin v. PDX, Inc. (2014) 227 
Cal.App.4th 159, 170 (misconstruing plaintiff’s claims to hold that Section 
230 did not immunize software provider that court incorrectly characterized 
as “participat[ing] in creating or altering content”). 
Yelp submits, respectfully, that this case presents the perfect 
opportunity for this Court to reconfirm the scope of Section 230 that 
Congress intended and appellate courts nationwide have repeatedly 
recognized.  As it did a decade ago, this Court should make clear that 
California courts must abide by Section 230’s grant of immunity to website 
                                                                                                                                     
at http://www.defamationremovallaw.com/2016/07/14/california-appellate-
court-decision-forces-yelp-remove-defamatory-review/ (“[t]he case is 
significant and represents a departure from current legal precedent because 
Yelp was never a party to the lawsuit, and typically most courts would have 
found the judgment unenforceable.  The ruling marks yet another blow in 
recent cases that have begun to chip away at the protections provided to 
websites like Yelp by Section 230 ….”). 
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operators like Yelp, which protects them from all court orders designed to 
restrict the information they publish on their websites. 
1. Congress Enacted Section 230 To Protect Website 
Publishers From Claims Like Those Asserted Here.  
The Internet has effected one of the greatest expansions of free 
speech and communications in history.  This is no accident.  In 1996, to 
promote the free flow of information on the Internet, Congress resolved to 
protect websites and other online providers from liability for their users’ 
content.  Section 230 embodies that command, prohibiting courts from 
treating such a provider as the “publisher or speaker” of third-party content.  
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  Grounded in core First Amendment principles, 
Section 230 offers strong protection for innovation and expansion of free 
speech on the Internet.  Since its enactment, federal and state courts have 
interpreted it to provide a “robust” immunity to companies that operate 
websites, such as Yelp, “from liability for publishing false or defamatory 
material so long as the information was provided by another party.”  
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) 339 F.3d 1119, 1122-23.  
In Barrett, this Court affirmed that the statute’s “blanket immunity” 
extends to “those who intentionally redistribute defamatory statements on 
the internet.”  40 Cal.4th at 62-63. 
The Act provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
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information provided by another information content provider,” and 
separately precludes imposition of any liability under state law inconsistent 
with its protections.   47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) & (e)(3).  Under Section 230, a 
website operator like Yelp is immune from claims if (1) it is a “provider or 
user of an interactive computer service” (which all websites are); (2) the 
action seeks to punish it as a “publisher or speaker”; and (3) the action is 
based on “information provided by another information content provider.”  
Id.  As shown below, Section 230 bars the injunction against Yelp, as well 
as any liability for failing to comply.  The appellate court’s decision to the 
contrary creates a gaping hole in Section 230 immunity that inevitably will 
be exploited to pursue the very actions Congress intended to bar.9 
2. The Court Of Appeal’s Superficial Analysis And 
Failure To Follow Section 230’s Plain Terms Create 
Tremendous Uncertainty in California As To The 
Scope Of Immunity Under The CDA. 
The court of appeal held that the injunction “does not violate section 
230 because it does not impose any liability on Yelp,” elaborating that  
“Hassell filed their complaint against Bird, not Yelp; obtained a default 
                                                 
9 This is no empty prognostication.  Innovative attorneys are seeking 
ways to obtain court orders for use in reputation management.  E.g., The 
Latest In Reputation Management: Bogus Defamation Suits From Bogus 
Companies Against Bogus Defendants, Mar. 22, 2016, available at 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160322/10260033981/latest-
reputation-management-bogus-defamation-suits-bogus-companies-against-
bogus-defendants.shtml; One Injunction To Censor Them All: Doe 





judgment against Bird, not Yelp; and was awarded damages and injunctive 
relief against Bird, not Yelp.”  Op. 28.   
The court invoked the unique procedural posture of this case—the 
result of Hassell’s intentional decision to deny Yelp the opportunity to 
defend itself—explaining that “[n]either party cite[d] any authority that 
applies section 230 to restrict a court from directing an Internet service 
provider to comply with a judgment which enjoins the originator of 
defamatory statements posted on the service provider’s Web site.”  Id.  This 
circular reasoning only rewards Hassell’s disdain for due process.  
The court’s decision is flatly contrary to other California decisions 
(as well as the many decisions of other courts that have considered and 
consistently applied Section 230).  For example, in Kathleen R. v. City of 
Liverpool (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 684, the court held that Section 230 
precludes claims for injunctive relief, explaining that “by its plain language, 
§ 230[(c)(1)] creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would 
make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party 
user of the service.”  Id. at 692, 697-698 (citation, internal quotes omitted).  
Thus, plaintiff’s equitable claims “contravene[d] section 230’s stated 
purpose of promoting unfettered development of the Internet no less than 
her damage claims.”  Id.10; see also Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002) 99 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. (E.D. Va. 2003) 261 
F.Supp.2d 532, 540, aff’d, 2004 WL 602711 (4th Cir. 2004) (“given that 
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Cal.App.4th 816, 831 (“If by imposing liability … we ultimately hold eBay 
responsible for content originating from other parties, we would be treating 
it as the publisher, viz., the original communicator, contrary to Congress’s 
expressed intent …” (citations omitted)); Doe II v. MySpace, 175 
Cal.App.4th at 563, 572-573 (rejecting claims against Internet social 
networking site based on failure to adopt safety measures to protect against 
sexual predators; “[a]t its core, appellants want MySpace to regulate what 
appears on its Web site” and “[t]hat type of activity—to restrict or make 
available certain material—is expressly covered by section 230”). 
 The court of appeal drastically departed from these rulings by 
misreading subsection (e)(3) of Section 230 and treating it as a limitation 
on the broad immunity established by subsection (c)(1).  The court held that 
Section 230 did not apply to the prior restraint it imposed on Yelp “because 
[the court did] not impose any liability on Yelp, either as a speaker or a 
publisher of third party speech.”  Op. at 29.  But Yelp is named in the 
injunction only for its role as publisher of the third-party reviews at issue, a 
straightforward contradiction of subsection (c)(1)’s prohibition on treating 
Yelp as the speaker or publisher of third-party content on its website.  
Subsection (e)(3) does not alter the broad immunity provided by subsection 
(c)(1), as the court of appeal implicitly held.  It merely affirms the ability of 
                                                                                                                                     
the purpose of § 230 is to shield service providers from legal responsibility 
for the statements of third parties, § 230 should not be read to permit claims 
that request only injunctive relief”). 
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state courts to entertain state law claims that are “consistent” with Section 
230, while making clear that “inconsistent” state law claims and liability 
are barred.11  The court of appeal’s decision to treat subsection (e)(3) as 
establishing the scope of immunity undermines the broad protection that 
Congress intended for online publishers like Yelp. 
At bottom, the court’s conclusion that “[i]f an injunction is itself a 
form of liability, that liability was imposed on Bird, not Yelp” (Op. at 
30)—relying on the fiction that the injunction against Yelp was not actually 
an injunction against Yelp (see footnote 3, supra)—exposes another 
fundamental flaw in its decision.  The court of appeal reached its result only 
by violating subsection (c)(1) and treating Yelp as if it was the author (or 
“speaker”) of the reviews at issue.  It held that Yelp could be enjoined, 
without notice or an opportunity to be heard, under a limited legal principle 
that allows courts to extend injunctions to non-parties who act on behalf of 
parties in violating the injunction, because Yelp purportedly was acting 
“with or for” Bird as the publisher of the statements at issue.  Op. 30-31, 
citing Conrad, 55 Cal.App.4th at 903; see Section A.2, supra.  This is, at its 
core, treating Yelp as if it, rather than simply Bird, published the allegedly 
defamatory content.  The court of appeal’s due process and Section 230 
                                                 
11 If section (e) encapsulated Section 230 immunity, then Section 
230 would not bar federal civil claims.  Plainly, that is not the case.  E.g., 
Sikhs for Justice “SFJ”, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015) 
144 F.Supp.3d 1088 (Section 230 barred federal and state claims). 
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holdings are fundamentally at odds with each other, resulting in a confusing 
and contradictory interpretation of each of these legal principles. 
“An action to force a website to remove content on the sole basis 
that the content is defamatory is necessarily treating the website as a 
publisher, and is therefore inconsistent with section 230.”  Medytox 
Solutions, Inc. v. Investorshub.com, Inc., 152 So.3d 727, 731 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App., 2014) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief).  Thus, 
“plaintiffs who contend they were defamed in an Internet posting may only 
seek recovery from the original source of the statement” (Barrett, 40 
Cal.4th at 40 (emphasis added)), because “Congress has decided that the 
parties to be punished and deterred are not the internet service providers but 
rather are those who created and posted the illegal material” (M.A. ex rel. 
P.K. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC (E.D. Mo. 2011) 809 F.Supp.2d 
1041, 1055).  The court of appeal’s holding flies in the face of these and 
other cases barring claims against website publishers. 
Nor is it relevant that many cases applying Section 230 to 
defamation claims involve “allegations of defamatory conduct by a third 
party, and not a judicial determination that defamatory statements had, in 
fact, been made by such third party on the Internet service provider’s 
website.”  Op. 30.  This case was able to proceed to a default judgment only 
because one of Hassell’s targets—the one that had the financial 
wherewithal to defend against her demand for an injunction—was 
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purposefully not named as a party or served with process in the case, and 
therefore could not prevent a result that is plainly barred by Section 230.  In 
any event, the court’s reasoning ignores the language of the CDA, which 
assumes that the statements are actually defamatory, but provides immunity 
regardless.  See also Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at 39-40.  This is a distinction 
without a difference, which only serves to inject confusion and ambiguity 
into Section 230 jurisprudence. 
As Hassell admits, there is “vibrant, extensive national jurisprudence 
on section 230.”  Respondents’ Appeal Brief (“R.A.B.”) at 43.  Yet, Hassell 
did not cite a single case to support her proposition that the CDA allows 
interactive computer services to be subject to injunctions to remove third-
party content so long as they are not named in an action.  Not a single court 
in any jurisdiction, state or federal, has so held—which is not surprising, 
given that Section 230(c)(1) flatly prohibits such a result, and plaintiffs 
typically satisfy the basic due process requirements that should have 
protected Yelp here.   
This Court’s admonition a decade ago in Barrett applies just as 
forcefully here.  “The Court of Appeal gave insufficient consideration to 
the burden its rule would impose on Internet speech.  … Congress sought to 
‘promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive 
computer services’” by granting broad immunity to “Internet 
intermediaries” such as Yelp.  40 Cal.4th at 56 (citations omitted; emphasis 
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added).  California should not break new ground to embrace such a skewed 
interpretation of Section 230—and invite the many lawsuits that will be 
filed here by forum shopping plaintiffs eager to force websites to remove 
critical content (contrary to this Court’s warning in Barrett, 40 Cal.4th at 
58).  This case requires a careful analysis of Section 230’s language and 
purpose.  That analysis simply did not occur here, leading to the patently 
incorrect interpretation of Section 230 that the court of appeal adopted.   
V. CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Yelp respectfully requests that the 
Court grant its Petition for Review and, on review, reverse the orders of the 
trial court and appellate court, and direct those courts to enter an order 
granting Yelp’s Motion to Vacate the Judgment. 
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Thomas R. Burke 
Rochelle L. Wilcox 
 
By: /s/ Rochelle L. Wilcox   
Rochelle L. Wilcox 





CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT 
(Cal. Rules of Court 8.504(d)) 
The text of this brief consists of 8,396 words as counted by the 
Microsoft Word word-processing program used to generate this brief, 
including footnotes but excluding the tables, the cover information required 
under rule 8.204(b)(10), the court of appeal opinion, this certificate, and the 
signature block. 
Dated:  July 18, 2016 DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 
Thomas R. Burke 
Rochelle L. Wilcox 
 
 
By: /s/ Deborah A. Adler   
Deborah A. Adler 
 







































Monique Olivier, Esq. 
Duckworth Peters Lebowitz Olivier LLP 
100 Bush Street, Suite 1800 
San Francisco, CA 94104 
Email: Monique@dplolaw.com  
Attorneys for  
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
Dawn Hassell, et al. 
Nitoj Singh, Esq. 
Dhillon Law Group Inc. 
177 Post Street, Suite 700 
San Francisco, CA 94108 
Email:  nsingh@dhillonsmith.com  
 
Hon. Ernest Goldsmith 
Dept. 302 
San Francisco Superior Court 
Civic Center Courthouse 
400 McAllister Street 
San Francisco, CA 94102-4514 
Case No.: CGC-13-530525 
 
Court of Appeal 
First Appellate District, Div. Four 
350 McAllister Street 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
Case No. A143233 
 
